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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal presents two important, and potentially far
reaching, public policy issues relating to (i) attorneys, (ii) the
manner in which they practice law, and (iii) the protections to be
afforded nonlitigants from being subjected to the unreasonable and
unconstitutional seizure, and public disclosure, of their private
and confidential business and financial records.
First,

and

of

utmost

concern

on

this

appeal,

is

a

nonlitigantfs constitutional right of privacy in his or her private
and confidential business and financial records, and necessity of
being afforded an opportunity to protect that right of privacy.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

declared

that

persons

have

a

constitutional right of privacy in their bank statements, checks,
loan applications, and all other papers and financial information
supplied to their bank, see, e.g., State

v. Thompson,

810 P.2d 415,

418 (Utah 1991) (persons are constitutionally protected "against
unreasonable

searches and seizures of their bank statements,

checks, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers
which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of
[their] financial affairs upon a reasonable assumption that the
information would remain confidential"). Appellants ask this Court
to declare that persons who are not parties to a lawsuit have a
constitutional right to receive, and that Utah R. Civ. P. 45(a)
requires that such nonlitigants be given, notice of a litigant's
attempts to subpoena confidential business and financial records

:i

from that nonlitigent's bank, so as to allow the nonlitigant an
opportunity to object to the subpoena in order to protect his or
her constitutional right of privacy.
Second, and although not a constitutional issue, but perhaps
equally as important in terms of the manner in which attorneys
practice law in the state of Utah, Appellants ask this Court to
declare that it is not permissible for an attorney to authorize
nonlawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice law by signing
pleadings, subpoenas, motions and other papers on behalf of the
attorney, where Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically mandates that all such papers be signed by a licensed
attorney.
Finally, as a result of the conduct engaged in by Appellee's
counsel (sometimes referred to as "Mr. Olsen") , Appellants request
that the trial court's order denying an award of attorneys' fees
and costs be reversed, and that the trial court be directed to make
findings as to the amount of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses
Appellants should be awarded as a result of Mr. Olsen's multiple
violations of Rule 11 and Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.1

The statement of facts in Appellee's brief contains a lengthy description of the acrimonious battle waged in the
trial court between Appellee and the plaintiff Clifford E. Holt. Although perhaps interesting, such battle does not justify
Appellee's trampling of Appellants' constitutionalrightof privacy, and is completely unrelated to the issues raised in
this appeal. Accordingly, lfl| 3-4,6-23, and 88-90 contained in Appellee's statement of facts should be disregarded and
stricken. Additionally, ^ 86 of Appellee's statement of facts does not cite to the record and should likewise be stricken.
Appellants also note that Appellee gives a somewhat misleading chronology of those facts which are relevant.
For example, in paragraphs 46 and 47, Appellee recites the fact that Appellant Terrance Frank was served with a
subpoena on March 23, 1996, and that he failed to appear at the deposition scheduled for April 11,1996. Only later, in
If 50, does Appellee mention that on or before April 1, 1996 (at least 10 days before April 11), Mr. Frank hadfileda
motion to quash the subpoena.
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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLEE
AND
HER
COUNSEL
VIOLATED
APPELLANTS1
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY BY SEIZING AND USING,
WITHOUT NOTICE TO APPELLANTS, APPELLANTS1 CONFIDENTIAL
BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RECORDS.
It is black letter law that Appellants have a constitutional

right

of

privacy

in

their

bank

statements,

checks,

applications, and all other papers and financial
supplied to their bank.

See, e.g., Thompson,

(persons are constitutionally

protected

loan

information

810 P.2d at 418

"against unreasonable

searches and seizures of their bank statements, checks, bonds, loan
applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which [they] supplied
to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affairs
upon a reasonable assumption that the information would remain
confidential").

The trial court acknowledged the existence of this

right of privacy when it ordered that the records produced by Bank
One relating to Park City Pharmacy, Inc. (the "Pharmacy") be sealed
(R. 730), and then stated that it was "going to honor [Appellants1]
position."

(R. 0732).

Appellee herself

also apparently concedes the existence of

such a right of privacy, inasmuch as she does not contest this
assertion in her opposition brief.2

Despite such concession,

Appellee and her counsel offer three excuses as to why their
violation of Appellants' right of privacy was allegedly justified.

furthermore, in support of her own motion for protective order, Appellee herself argued to the trial court that
a person has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her telephone records. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Protective Order [sic] (R. 0497-0499).

3

First, Appellee argues that as of the date that the subpoena
to Bank One was prepared and served on Bank One, she and her
counsel were unaware that Terrance Frank ("Mr. Frank") had any
interest in the Pharmacy, and that they believed that Clifford E.
Holt was the sole owner of the Pharmacy.

Second, Appellee claims

she provided notice to the Pharmacy by serving notice of Bank Onefs
deposition on Evelyn Saunders, counsel for plaintiff Clifford E.
Holt.

Third, Appellee and her counsel argue they were justified in

seizing and using Appellants1 confidential financial information
because Appellants did not move to quash the Bank One subpoena.
None of the three excuses offered by Appellee justify or alter
the

fact that Appellee and her counsel violated Appellants'

constitutional right of privacy by seizing and using, without
providing

any

notice to Appellants, Appellants1

confidential

business and financial information.3
A.

The Notice Of Deposition Served On Plaintiff's
Counsel Was Insufficient To Provide Notice To
Appellants Of The Bank One Subpoena. The Pharmacy
Had A Constitutional Right To Receive Prior Notice
That Appellee Was Subpoenaing The Pharmacy's
Confidential Bank Records.

Appellants do not dispute the fact that Appellee's counsel
provided notice of the Bank One subpoena to Evelyn Saunders,

3

Appellee also asserts, in footnote 1 of her brief, that Appellants failed to raise below the constitutionalrightof
privacy issue with respect to the Bank One subpoena and are, therefore, barred from raising it on this appeal. It is
difficult to understand how Appellee can, in good faith and within the confines of Rule 11, make such an argument.
Appellants' counsel spoke at length about the Bank One subpoena during the May 16, 1996 hearing, and obtained an
orderfromthe trial court at that hearing that all of the Bank One records relating to the Pharmacy be sealed. (R. 07290732). Additionally, in their Motion for Sanctions (the very motion at issue on this appeal), Appellants argued at length
that the Bank One subpoena violated Appellants' constitutionalrightof privacy. (R. 0555-0559), specifically asserted
that "Mr. Olsen's surreptitious subpoena to Park City Pharmacy, Inc.'s bank not only broke the rules of civil procedure
but it also violated his constitutionalrightto privacy ..." (R. 0559).

4

counsel for plaintiff.

However, even Appellee must concede that

Ms. Saunders represented only Appellee's ex-husband, and has never
represented Mr. Frank or the Pharmacy.

Notice to Ms. Saunders, as

a matter

constitute

of

law,

simply

does not

notice to the

Pharmacy.4
To the extent Appellee asserts she had no obligation to notify
the Pharmacy of her attempts to obtain the Pharmacy's confidential
banking information, such a position is completely inconsistent
with the constitutional right of privacy which the Utah Supreme
Court

has

held

exists

with

respect

to

such

information.

Accordingly, any interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P 45(a) which would
not require notice to a person whose confidential bank records were
the target of a subpoena would render the rule unconstitutional.
It has long been a principle of statutory construction that the
courts will

seek to harmonize

a statute with

constitutional

principles in order to avoid an interpretation which would render
a rule or statute unconstitutional.
(Ogden)
Control,

and No. 2021

(Moab) v.

905 P. 2d 1189, 1202

See, e.g.,

Department

Elks Lodges No. 719

of Alcoholic

(Utah 1995)

Beverage

(M[t]his court will

construe a challenged statute to avoid constitutional infirmities
wherever possible") .
Here, the only way to interpret Rule 45(a) in a manner which
is consistent with a person's constitutional right of privacy in

It is uncontested that neither Mr. Frank, the Pharmacy, or their counsel were aware of the existence of the
Bank One subpoena, or of Appellee's counsel's acquisition of the Pharmacy's confidential banking information, until
after Appellee's counsel had already acquired and used the Pharmacy's confidential banking information in a deposition.
(R. 0729-0730).

5

his or her confidential business and bank records is to interpret
the rule in a manner which imposes an obligation on counsel to
notify all parties, including any party affected by a subpoena, of
efforts to obtain confidential bank records. Absent such notice,
a person1s constitutional right of privacy in bank records would be
effectively eviscerated.

A nonlitigant whose bank records become

the target of a subpoena would be left without any opportunity to
protect his or her constitutional right of privacy, and would be
subjected to the real risk that his or her confidential business
and financial records would be publicly disseminated, as happened
in

this

case

when

Appellee's

counsel

used

the

Pharmacy's

confidential bank records in a deposition.5
B.

Appellee And Her Counsel Knew That Mr. Frank Had An
Ownership Interest In The Pharmacy At The Time They
Prepared And Served The Subpoena On Bank One.

Appellee's assertion that she and her counsel had no knowledge
that Mr. Frank was an owner of the Pharmacy, and that they believed
Clifford E. Holt was the sole owner of the Pharmacy, at the time
they prepared and served the subpoena on Bank One is simply false.
On February 5, 1996, Mr. Olsen prepared a notice of records
deposition, wherein Mr. Olsen asserted he was seeking from Mr.
Frank the identical documents which later became at issue in the
subpoenas served on Mr. Frank on March 23, 1996.

5

On February

A nonlitigant'srightto receive prior notice of a subpoena served on its bank can be particularly important in
the commercial context, where the records being subpoenaed may include valuable trade secret information. For
example, the bank records subpoenaed and obtained by Appellee included, without limitation, over 4,000 checks. Those
documents would reveal both the identity of the Pharmacy's suppliers, and the prices charged by the suppliers. Thus,
the bank records contain information which clearly constitutes valuable trade secrets, and which could be used to put the
Pharmacy at a competitive disadvantage if it were to fall into the hands of the Pharmacy's competitors.

6

12,1996, Mr. Olsen then prepared, and subsequently made efforts to
serve, a subpoena on Mr. Frank, which subpoena was virtually
identical to the one which was served on Mr. Frank on March 23,
1996.

(See, e.g., Appellee^ Brief at 12, 55 32-32; R. 0611-0613,

0616-0618).
prepared

the

It was not until three weeks after having first
notice

of

deposition,

and

after

having

been

unsuccessful in their attempts to serve Mr. Frank with the February
subpoena,6 that Appellee's counsel prepared the subpoena to Bank
One.

(R. 0349-0350).

And it was not until March 11, 1996, after

having apparently received a copy of the Affidavit of Terrance
Frank, wherein Mr. Frank testified that he was sole owner of the
Pharmacy,7 that Appellee served her subpoena on Bank One.
Contrary to her representations to this Court, Appellee and
her counsel clearly knew, at least as early as three weeks before
the subpoena to Bank One was ever prepared, that Mr. Frank was an
owner of the Pharmacy.

Despite such knowledge, Appellee and her

counsel never provided any notice of any kind to Mr. Frank or the
Pharmacy of their efforts to obtain the Pharmacy's confidential
financial information from Bank One.8

Appellee had provided an incorrect address to the constable. (R. 0743).
7

Mr. Frank's affidavit was served, via mail, on March 7, 1996. (R. 0334).

Furthermore, even after Appellants formally appeared in this case andfiledtheir written objections to the
subpoena served on Mr. Frank, Appellee's counsel still did not disclose to Appellants or their counsel the fact that he
had already obtained the Pharmacy's confidential financial information. Nor did Mr. Olsen notify Appellants that he
intended to use the Pharmacy's confidential information in a deposition, notwithstanding the fact that Appellants had
filed a motion for protective order, objecting to Appellee's efforts obtainfromMr. Frank the very type of information
Appellee was planning on using in the deposition. As set forth in more detail below, such conduct and willful
nondisclosures, in addition to other misconduct engaged in by Appellee's counsel, warrant the imposition of appropriate
sanctions.

7

C.

The Pharmacy Could Not Move To Quash The Bank One
Subpoena Because It Did Not Know About The
Existence Of The Subpoena.

Appellee's assertion that the Pharmacy's failure to move to
quash the Bank One subpoena is simply a red herring.

Appellee

never notified the Pharmacy of the existence of the Bank One
subpoena, and it is undisputed that the Pharmacy did not learn of
the

subpoena

until

after Appellee

had

already

obtained

the

Pharmacy's confidential financial information from Bank One, and
used them in a deposition.

The Pharmacy simply could not move to

quash a subpoena that it did not know existed.

Furthermore, upon

learning of the Bank One subpoena, Appellant's counsel obtained
from the trial court an order that all of the Pharmacy's records
obtained from Bank One be sealed, that the records be returned to
Appellants, and that Appellee and her counsel were prohibited from
maintaining any copies of such documents.
II.

(R. 0730, 0872-0873).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS1
FEES WITHOUT EVER RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE UNDERLYING
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS.
A.

The Trial Court Failed To Make Any Findings As To
Whether Appellee's Counsel Violated Rule 45 And
Rule 11.

As a general rule, a trial court's failure to make findings on
all material issues constitutes reversible error.
Butler

v.

Pinecrest

Pipeline

Operating

Co.,

See, e.g.,

909 P.2d 255, 231-32

(Utah 1995) . This is especially true with respect to an appellate
court's review of a trial court's 0 determination, where the first
step in the appellate review is a review of the trial court's
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.

8

See, e.g.,

Barnard

v.

Sutliff,

846 P.2d 1229, 1234

(Utah 1992).

Absent

findings of fact by the trial court on a Rule 11 motion, the
appellate court simply cannot perform the first step in its review
of the trial court1s ruling.
Here, the trial court failed to make any finding of facts with
respect to Appellants' motion for sanctions. Consequently, it also
failed to make any determination as to whether the conduct engaged
in by Appellee's counsel violated Rule 11 or Rule 45 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Such failure constitutes reversible

error and, ordinarily, would require that this matter be remanded
to allow the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to these issues.

However,

inasmuch as the

facts in this case are clear and uncontroverted, and because it is
purely a question of law as to whether Mr. Olsen's conduct
constitutes a violation of Rule 11, See, e.g.,
Taylor,

Taylor

v. Estate

of

770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court can and

should make the legal determination that Mr. Olsen's conduct
violated Rules 11 and 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It

is particularly appropriate for this Court to reach these issues
given the importance of the constitutional right of privacy at
issue, and the importance of the issue of whether an attorney can
delegate to his or her secretary or any other nonlawyer the
attorney's Rule

11 obligation to sign subpoenas, notices of

depositions, motions and other papers to be filed with the Court.

9

B.

Mr. Olsen's Conduct Clearly Violated Utah R. Civ.
P. 11 And 45.

Rule 11 requires that *[e]very pleading, written motion, and
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(a).

Such requirement is imposed, at least

in part, because in signing pleadings and other papers, the
attorney is making certain representations to the court.
e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b).

See,

Thus, Rule 11 imposes certain duties

on an attorney as an officer of the court, as opposed to the
attorney's private duty to his or her client.

Clark

v. Booth,

821

P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
Similarly, Rule 45 imposes certain duties on attorneys which
include, without limitation, an obligation to "take reasonable
steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject
to [a] subpoena."

Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1).

duty, as with violation of Rule 11,
sanctions

including, but

attorneys' fees.

not

limited

Violation of this

subjects the attorney to
to,

lost

earnings and

Id.

Here, Mr. Olsen's conduct clearly violated Rule 11 and Rule 45
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although addressed at length
in Appellants' opening brief, Mr. Olsen's conduct is summarized
below;
1.

Mr. Olsen authorized his secretary to sign at

least 26 different subpoenas, notices of deposition,
motions and other papers served on various parties and
filed with the court below. These documents include the

10

subpoenas and notices of deposition served on Mr. Frank,
(See, e.g., Addendum to the Brief of Appellants, Exhibit
9);
2.

The subpoenas served on Mr. Frank, Bank One,

and other third parties did not contain the notice to
persons served with a subpoena, as mandated by Utah R.
Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C).

(See, e.g., R. 0800-0802, 0304-

0307, 0402-0408);
3.

The subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Frank on

March 23, 1996, purported to require Mr. Frank to produce
documents eight (8) days later on April 1, 1996 (R.
0406), in violation of Rule 45(b)(4), and (c)(2)(A),
which mandate that the witness be given at least fourteen
(14) days to comply with the subpoena;9
4*

The subpoenas served on Mr. Frank on March 23,

1996 not only purported to require Mr. Frank to produce
his own personal documents, they also purported to
required

him to produce documents belonging to the

Pharmacy, a legal entity completely separate and distinct
from Mr. Frank.
5.
obtained
financial

(R. 0402-0408).;

Mr.

Olsen

the

Pharmacy's

information

served

the

Bank

confidential

One

subpoena,

business

and

from Bank One, and used that

9

To add to the confusion caused by the defective subpoena duces tecum, Appellee also served Mr. Frank with '<
"subpoena" purporting to require Mr. Frank to appear and produce documents on April 11,1996. This second
subpoena was also defective because it did not contain the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena, and
because it sought to unconstitutionally invade Appellants' constitutional right to privacy.

11

confidential information in a deposition, all without
ever providing notice to the Pharmacy, and while have
actual knowledge that Mr. Frank claimed an ownership
interest in the Pharmacy;
6.

Mr. Olsen used the Pharmacyfs confidential

financial information in a deposition (1) after having
received actual notice that the Pharmacy objected to any
efforts by Appellee to obtain and use information similar
or identical to the information Appellee obtained from
Bank

One

and

used

in

the

deposition,

(2)

after

Appellants1 had moved to quash the subpoena served on Mr.
Frank, and (3) after the trial court had already ruled
that the very type of information Appellee was seeking
from

Bank

One with

respect

to

the

Pharmacy

(i.e,

confidential bank records) was confidential, was not
discoverable and could not be obtained via a subpoena
which Appellee had served on another non-party, Clifford
L. Holt, father of the plaintiff.

(See, e.g., R. 0309-

0312, 0398) ; and
7.

Mr.

Olsen

filed

a

frivolous

motion

for

sanctions, asserting that Mr. Frank had disobeyed the
subpoena by failing to appear and produce documents on
April 11, 1996, when in fact Mr. Frank had already filed
a motion to quash and was, therefore, relieved of any
obligation to appear and produce documents, in accordance
with Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(C).
12

The undisputed

facts demonstrate that, at

least

in the

underlying litigation below, Mr. Olsen compounded rule violation
upon rule violation, and engaged in a pattern and practice of
violating Rule 11, Rule 45 and Appellants' constitutional right of
privacy.10

Notwithstanding these violations, Mr. Olsen asserts his

conduct should be excused because the subpoenas served on Mr. Frank
were each issued by the Clerk of the Court after having been signed
by Mr. Olsen1s secretary.

Such argument ignores the fact that, in

addition to those three subpoenas, Mr. Olsen's secretary signed at
least 23 other notices of depositions, motions and other paper.

It

also ignores the fundamental requirement of Rule 11 that every
pleading or other paper be signed by an attorney licensed to
practice law.
Mr.

Olsen1s

conduct

in

allowing

his

secretary

to sign

subpoenas and other papers filed with the Court is no different
than if he had allowed a disbarred attorney to sign the documents
at issue.

Surely the courts would not countenance any lawyer's

practice which allowed a disbarred attorney to sign papers on
behalf of the licensed attorney.

Similarly, this Court should not

countenance Mr. Olsen's habit of allowing his secretary, who is not
a lawyer, to sign subpoenas, notices, motions and other papers
filed with the trial court.

Rule 11 mandates that licensed

Mr. Olsen's secretary's failure to include the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena, the failure to
allow Mr. Frank at least 14 days notice of the day he was required to produce documents, and the attempt to require Mr.
Frank to produce corporate documents without serving the corporation are precisely the reasons Rule 11 requires
licensed attorneys, who are presumably familiar with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to sign pleadings, subpoenas,
motions and other papers.

13

attorneys sign documents such as those signed by Mr. Olsen's
secretary. Mr. Olsen's conduct is a clear violation of Rule 11 and
Rule 45, and this Court should make such a finding on this appeal.
C.

Appellants Have Not Waived Their Objections To The
Defective Subpoenas.

Appellee asserts that Appellants waived any objections to the
defective subpoenas, by "stipulating] to what documentation and
other material will be provided to [Appellee's] counsel." Brief of
Appellee, at 41.

In making this argument, Appellee misleadingly

fails to provide this Court with the context necessary to determine
whether the so-called stipulation in fact constitutes a waiver.

At

the May 16, 1996 hearing on Appellant's motion to quash, the trial
court stated:
I am asking counsel, as a courtesy to each
other, and as an act of deference to the
Court, to seal the records that are
questionable in any way as having any bearing
in this lawsuit. We will give [Appellants]
the protective order. And I want the records
surrendered to the Court, and they will be
under seal. The Court believes that if the
request is as it has been articulated, counsel
[for Appellee] should be entitled to receive
copies of any checks from the plaintiff's
employer to the plaintiff in a relevant time
frame.
(R. 0733).

In response to the trial court's request for deference,

and the trial court's order that both Mr. Frank and the Pharmacy
produce documents, even though the Pharmacy had never been properly
subpoenaed, Appellants produced documents.
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Even then, however, the

documents were produced under the trial court's protective order.11
Moreover, in producing these documents (according the trial court
deference and abiding by its wishes), Appellants in no way waived
any

objections to the defective subpoenas, and the enormous

consequent legal fees.

Even after agreeing to produce documents at

the May 16 hearing, counsel for Appellants continued to argue that
the subpoenas were invalid and that sanctions should be imposed.
In response to those arguments, the trial court ruled that it was
"going to take the question of fees and costs under advisement . .
(R. 0744).

Appellants simply did not waive their objections to

the defective subpoenas by complying with the trial court's request
for deference, and by agreeing to produce documents which the trial
court ordered be produced.
D.

The Trial Court's Failure To Make Any Findings With
Respect To Its Basis For Refusing To Award
Attorneys' Fees To Appellants Is Reversible Error.

The trial court clearly erred by not providing any findings or
basis for its refusal to award attorneys' fees in this matter.
See, e.g., Cabrera

v. Cottrell,

694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985)

("attorney fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence and . .
. findings of fact should be made which support the award") .
As Appellee herself points out in her brief, the only finding
made, or basis given, by the trial court with respect to the denial
of fees was that the underlying divorce case "represented a very
acrimonious, cantankerous, long, drawn out lawsuit, where there

Appellee asserts on page 42 of her brief that Appellants failed to produce documents. Such alleged "fact" is
not supported by any citation to the record, and thus must be stricken.
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have

been allegations

and counter

allegations

of deceit and

subterfuge and concealment and non-compliance and non-cooperation,
ad nauseam."

(R. 0874).

Undoubtedly, the underlying divorce

case was just as described by the trial court.

However, the fact

that the fight Plaintiff and Appellee chose to engage in was
acrimonious

and

cantankerous

in no way

justifies

Appellee's

decision to trample upon Appellants' constitutional
privacy.

right of

Nor does such fact constitute findings of fact which

could provide any proper basis whatsoever for the trial court's
denial of the costs and fees incurred by Appellants as a result of
Appellee's, and her counsel's, violation of Rules 11 and 45, and
their

intentional

and

willful

invasion

of

Appellants'

constitutional right of privacy.
It is Appellee's and her counsel's failure to comply with the
Rules of Civil Procedure, and their
Appellants1

constitutional

right

of

intentional
privacy,

invasion of
which

caused

Appellants to incur a substantial amount of attorneys' fees and
costs.

Accordingly, it is appropriate that Appellee and her

counsel bear the burden of the costs and fees incurred as a result
of their misconduct.

This matter should be remanded to the trial

court with directions that it make specific findings as to the
amount of attorneys' fees, costs,

and other sanctions which should
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be imposed upon Appellee and her counsel as a result of their
willful violations of Rule 11 and Rule 45, and their intentional
and unconscionable violation of Appellants1 constitutional right of
privacy.12
CONCLUSION
Appellants clearly had (and have) a constitutional right of
privacy in their confidential banking records.

Appellee and her

counsel invaded that right of privacy by obtaining and publicly
disseminating Appellants' confidential bank records.

Appellee's

counsel also violated Rule 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P., on multiple
occasions.

Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Appellants'

motion for sanctions should be reversed.

This Court can and should

make a determination that Appellee and her counsel violated Rules
11 and 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and violated
Appellants' constitutional right of privacy.

This matter should

then be remanded to the trial court with directions to make

12

Appellee cites Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978) as support for the proposition that the
trial court's denial of attorneys' fees must be reviewed under a patent error or clear abuse of discretion standard.
Appellee's interpretation of Beckstrom is, at best, a liberal reading of the case. In reality, however, unlike in this case,
the trial court in Beckstrom made findings of fact, conclusions of law and determined that $500 in attorneys' fees should
be awarded, as opposed to the $800 which had been sought. Under those circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that it would not disturb the trial court's findings absent "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Beckstrom, 578
P.2dat523.
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specific findings of fact as to the amount of attorneys' fees,
costs and other sanctions which should be imposed as a result of
such violations.
DATED this .

zv4

day of August, 1997
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